

# **Afghanistan: Assessing the Progress of Security Sector Reform, One Year After the Geneva Conference**

*Results of the BICC E-Conference*

*4-11 June 2003*




**By Mark Sedra**

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## **I. Background on the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and its Work on Afghanistan**

The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) is an independent non-profit organization dedicated to promoting the transfer of former military resources and assets to alternative civilian purposes. The transfer of resources from the military to the civilian sector represents both a social and an economic challenge, as well as offering an opportunity for the states concerned. Established in 1994 with support from the German State of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), BICC's expertise has broadened from its traditional base in conversion to encompass the following areas:

- Military technology, production and expenditures
- Economics, resources and conflict
- Disarmament, arms control and surplus weapons
- Small arms control
- Security sector reform
- Demobilization and development
- Base closure and redevelopment
- Current conflicts and preventive conversion

As an international think tank and clearinghouse, BICC conducts research and makes policy recommendations; offers project management and consulting services to public and private organizations at the national and international level; and collects and disseminates data and information to practitioners in a wide range of fields and institutions. BICC strives to reach researchers and practitioners as well as policy-makers, the media, and the general public by means of a variety of tools, including: its publications and annual yearbook, its library, its extensive on-line documentation services, and its internet service ([www.bicc.de](http://www.bicc.de)).

### ***BICC Afghan Security Sector Reform Monitoring Project***

In May 2002, BICC established a project to monitor the internationally-supported security sector reform process in Afghanistan, which was formally set in motion at the Geneva security donors meeting of April 2002. The aim of the project is to analyze and assess developments in regard to the five pillars of the security sector reform agenda: military reform; police reform; judicial reform, counter-narcotics; and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR). The project offers research and advisory services to international organizations, governments and non-governmental organizations. It has produced a number of articles and publications, including BICC Paper 25, titled, *Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan* and the Foreign Policy in Focus (FPiF) Special Report titled, *Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction: Where do we go from here?*. The e-conference aimed to further one of the wider objectives of the project, to promote dialogue among various Afghan and international stakeholders and observers on Afghan security issues. If you would like more information on the project, please contact Mark Sedra (Project Leader) at [sedra@bicc.de](mailto:sedra@bicc.de).

## **II. Introduction**

For eight days, from 4-11 June 2003, BICC hosted an e-conference on "Afghanistan: Assessing the Progress of Security Sector Reform, One Year After the Geneva Conference." Over 100 participants representing various inter-governmental organizations, NGOs, academic institutions, donor governments and the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) took part. The conference focussed on three aspects of the security sector reform process: military reform; police reform; and the

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants. However, all facets of the current security situation were addressed. The discussion was vibrant and produced a number of interesting and innovative findings. It resulted in a list of 36 policy recommendations on how to address insecurity in Afghanistan and reenergize the security sector reform process. The recommendations were drawn from the fourteen papers produced for the conference and the conference discussion.

There was a clear consensus among conference participants that a reappraisal of current policies in regard to security is required. The sharp rise in insecurity in recent months, raising the specter of a collapse of the Bonn process, has highlighted a number of shortcomings in the current security sector reform agenda. Accordingly, the conference focussed its attention on devising strategies to rectify these deficiencies and overcome the imposing threats to Afghan security and stability. These threats include warlordism; spoiler groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami; and the burgeoning narcotics trade. However, it should be recognized that meeting these overt challenges to the new political order may not fully address the security needs of the average Afghan. Therefore, the conference considered the related dimension of human security, emphasizing the need for measures to advance economic development and the empowerment of marginalized groups. It is clear that a wide-ranging and multi-faceted approach to security is required in Afghanistan.

A common theme of the conference, clearly expressed in the recommendations, is that an expansion of donor support for Afghanistan is urgently needed. Current levels of international aid to Afghanistan are simply not commensurate to the scale of the reconstruction and security challenges that exist. Accordingly, it is critical that donors, most notably the United States and the European Union, significantly augment their political, military and economic support to Afghanistan. Many of the recommendations offered are contingent, to a certain degree, on an expansion of support. The impact of international neglect of Afghanistan at this critical juncture in the country's history would be devastating, not only for the Afghan people but also for the security of the region and the world.

### **III. Recommendations**

#### **1. Reform of the Afghan Ministry's of Defence (MOD) and Interior (MOI)**

The success of the entire security sector reform enterprise depends on reforms made in the MOD and MOI. Efforts to reform these two ministries, to make them ethnically representative and accountable, have been largely unsuccessful thus far. More concerted pressure must be applied by the international community, most notably the United States, on the responsible Ministers to implement the needed reforms.

#### ***Military Reform***

#### **2. Reform of the Afghan Military Force (AMF)**

Even if a DDR process is initiated in the coming weeks or months, existing military forces and structures will remain a factor in the country for some time. In addition to the current program to create an Afghan National Army (ANA), efforts should be taken to reform the AMF. Steps that could be taken in this regard include:

- A. The appointment of new commanders to some of the existing AMF divisions, especially in south- and southeast Afghanistan. These commanders should include generals from the army of the Najibullah regime. They possess previous military training and could impose much-needed discipline on the troops.

- B. The antiquated military equipment of some AMF units, particularly those directly involved in combat against the remnants of the Taliban, should be upgraded. This could be achieved by redistributing equipment from better-equipped units in other parts of the country. For example, transport equipment, which has been hoarded by Defence Minister Fahim's troops in Kabul and Panjshir, should be transferred to these units.

**3. Establish Regional Military Training Centers**

Currently, virtually all ANA training activities are carried out at in the capital at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC). The establishment of regional training outposts could accelerate the training process, encourage regional recruitment and raise the profile of the army outside the capital. Such an initiative could give a major boost to the military reform process which has proceeded at an unexpectedly slow rate.

***Police Reform***

**4. Increase Donor Support to LOFTA**

Donors should increase funding to the UNDP administered Law and Order Trust Fund (LOFTA), which is intended to cover the recurrent budgetary expenses, most importantly salaries, of the country's police. In spite of the importance of this initiative, as of June 2003 only \$11 million of the \$75 million target for the fund has been secured. This glaring shortfall must be rectified.

**5. Create Independent Monitoring Structures**

Monitoring and accountability structures for police performance should be developed, such as the establishment of a Police Ombudsman. A recent report by Amnesty International titled, *Afghanistan: Police reconstruction essential for the protection of human rights*, affirms that there is "a widespread lack of public faith in the police" in Afghanistan. As Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali has stated: "The police cannot do their job without the co-operation of the people." Accordingly, it is acutely necessary to take measures to raise public confidence in the police. The creation of a police oversight body could greatly advance such confidence-building efforts.

**6. More Support to a Quick Reaction Force**

International donors should assist the Ministry of Interior in forming and operating a Quick Reaction Force capable of being deployed in all of the country's provinces to address urgent security threats. This force could also be utilized to facilitate the implementation of the constitutional consultation process and DDR.

**7. Establish an Adequate Screening Process**

An effective screening mechanism should be established to ensure that new recruits for the Kabul Police Academy and the National Police Training Center (NPTC) have not previously been involved in human rights violations or are tainted by previous involvement in a militia activity.

**8. Establish Regional Police Training Centers**

Currently, all police training is limited to Kabul where the Kabul Police Academy and the NPTC are situated. To abandon the Kabul-centric approach to the process, police training facilities should be established in the provinces. This provides a concrete means to accelerate the police reform process, to ensure that the composition of the force reflects the country's ethnic make-up, and to extend the central government's authority to outlying areas.

**9. More International Support to the Human Rights Unit of the Ministry of the Interior**

The Minister of the Interior has recently established a human rights office within the Ministry in response to calls for an internal mechanism for monitoring the police. While it is too early to judge

whether or not this unit will be an effective mechanism to address violations by the police, it is unlikely to become so if it is not given sufficient donor support, in terms of technical, material and financial assistance. International support to such a unit could have a dual outcome: First, the unit itself could become an effective way of addressing problems within the police force and, second, sufficient and substantial international support would send a message that the international community will no longer accept the system of impunity in Afghanistan.

#### **10. Establish a National Police Code of Conduct**

A national police code of conduct based on international standards for law enforcement officials needs to be adopted and disseminated both to the police and the general population. The various police training projects underway need to incorporate this code of conduct into their curriculums and it must be made clear in all training courses that police will be held accountable when they breach this code. This linkage should be reinforced through regular communication and co-ordination with accountability initiatives, particularly the new human rights office in the Ministry of Interior, to ensure that there is consistent post-training monitoring of police. To date, training initiatives have not been linked with any sort of accountability mechanisms.

#### **11. More Attention Must be Paid to Afghanistan's Prison System**

The criminal justice system will only be able to operate effectively when each component part, police, courts and prisons, is functioning properly. While there has been consistent international attention on the reconstruction of the police in Afghanistan and increasing attention on the functioning of the courts, there has been extremely little international attention paid to the reconstruction of the prison system. The only donor project in this regard is focused on the reconstruction of Pul-e Charkhi prison, in the outskirts of Kabul. But a single large prison in Kabul will not effectively address the problems faced by prisoners across the country, who are held in district and provincial detention facilities that are often overcrowded, dilapidated, and lacking basic sanitation. The urge to centralize the prison system in Pul-e Charkhi should be resisted as this could have a number of detrimental impacts on prisoners and their families. Emphasis should instead be put on reconstructing provincial detention facilities across the country. Prison staff throughout Afghanistan lack training in correctional work. As with many government employees, even their extremely meagre salaries are infrequently disbursed.

In March 2003, a presidential decree transferred the administration of prisons from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice. The practicalities and logistical details of this transfer have yet to be worked out, leaving the day-to-day duties of administration, including the payment of salaries and the provision of food, still in the hands of the Ministry of Interior. More technical assistance and pressure from the international community needs to be given to ensure that this transfer of responsibility to the Ministry of Justice is completed in a productive manner that advances efforts to build a modern correctional system in line with international human rights standards.

### ***Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration of Former Combatants (DDR)***

#### **12. DDR Cannot be Implemented in a Security Vacuum**

At present, what security exists on the ground results from fragile political agreements between local warlords and local militias charged by their commanders with protecting local populations. A DDR process which moves ahead without an international security presence, and which disarms some factions and not others by relying on militia leaders to disarm their own troops, risks undermining what little security does exist. Accordingly, the DDR process should be put on hold until there is a serious international commitment to provide security in areas where DDR is moving ahead.

**13. Concentrate on ‘R’ over ‘DD’**

The preconditions for the implementation of a DDR program in Afghanistan – a political consensus among key powerbrokers and a minimum level of security – have clearly not been met. The longer it takes to initiate the process, the more frustration will build among ex-combatants. It is critical that they begin to visualize their civilian future, abandoning the identity of a combatant, as soon as possible. Concentrating on reintegration ahead of disarmament and demobilization will help to build the capacity of the market place to lure combatants away from their militia units and into a peace-based economy, thereby creating an environment conducive for a large-scale disarmament and demobilization program.

Practically speaking this process could be initiated by providing a pilot group of voluntarily demobilized ex-combatants with high-quality reintegration assistance that leads to alternative employment. This will, in turn, entice other ex-combatants to follow suit. In the current political environment, DD is likely not feasible, but reintegration activities in the form of local economic development, employment in infrastructure projects, vocational training, and small business promotion schemes should not be delayed.

In many respects the situation in Afghanistan defies conventional DDR logic. Accordingly, a non-conventional approach that does not necessarily adhere to the linear D-D-R formula may be what is needed to break the deadlock and jumpstart the process. Paradoxically, RDD may be the answer to Afghanistan’s DDR dilemma.

**14. Forge a Political Consensus Regarding Key Aspects of DDR**

A political consensus must be forged immediately among key Afghan powerbrokers regarding the goals, scope and duration of a DDR process. Two developments in the past three months show that progress is being made towards achieving this goal. First, in late April 2003, the Afghan government convened a two-day conference, assembling Afghanistan’s senior military commanders, to reach an agreement regarding the ongoing security sector reform process. This was the first military meeting of its type since the fall of the Taliban. A statement issued at the end of the conference stated that the participants agreed to work with the central government for the good of the country’s security and to build a multi-ethnic national army. Second, in late May 2003, 12 of Afghanistan’s major powerbrokers signed an agreement to hand over customs revenues to the central government and to stop all military interference in the country’s political and civil affairs. Taken together, these two developments represent a watershed in the effort to bind Afghanistan’s powerbrokers to the new political order, but more must be done. Afghan history shows that the signing of agreements marks only the first stage in a negotiating process. The U.S. should exploit the recent breakthroughs by utilizing its considerable economic and political leverage with Afghanistan’s warlords to pressure them to fulfil their commitments.

**15. Conduct a Large-Scale Survey of Afghan Combatants and Profile Militia Commanders**

Successful post-war demobilization and resettlement require good data for planning purposes. The Afghan DDR process lacks a foundation of good data and research. Accordingly, DDR planners have not been operating with a precise picture of the problem facing a prospective program. An extensive countrywide survey, aimed to determine the socio-economic positions and needs of ex-combatants must be conducted.

There is also a dearth of detailed information on the command structures of Afghanistan’s militia groups. One of the most difficult obstacles facing the demobilization process will be the mid-level commanders. A combination of incentives and force will be needed to deal with them. While the number of top commanders or warlords is not difficult to determine, the country’s sub-

commanders form a much more amorphous group. It is necessary to list and profile these figures in order to devise strategies on how to deal with them during the demobilization process.

#### **16. Focus on Job Creation**

There is tendency during a DDR processes to place more emphasis on aspects of disarmament and demobilization than reintegration. This is a mistake for if combatants cannot be offered alternative livelihoods, a means to care for themselves and their families, there will be no impetus to reenter civilian life. The demilitarization of Afghan society cannot be achieved unless suitable reintegration opportunities are available to former combatants. To a certain degree, “it all comes down to jobs”. Even if the international community provides ex-combatants with vocational training, tool kits or micro-credit for small business creation, if the economy remains stagnant and no employment is forthcoming, the process will collapse. Job creation is the key to demilitarizing Afghan society. An increase in donor-supported investment projects would have an enormous impact in creating employment for the multitudes of unemployed Afghans, among them ex-combatants.

#### **17. Donor Funding**

It is important that donor states and agencies make long-term commitments to the DDR process. Currently, financial support is not an issue of concern as \$50.7 million has been committed to the process, an amount sufficient to cover the costs of the current DDR program (the Afghan New Beginnings Programme) for its first year of operation. With the cost of the entire process estimated to be \$127 million, and this figure is sure to increase as the process develops, more money will have to be raised in the coming months. The task of mobilizing funds for a DDR process while it is underway has proven to be problematic in other contexts, thus donor states should commit to underwriting the process in its entirety.

#### **18. Community-Based Approaches**

Previous DDR experiences show that the outcome of reintegration depends, to a certain degree, on the support ex-combatants receive from the communities to which they are returning. Accordingly, increasing the absorptive capacity of communities will greatly advance DDR. Community based approaches provide an effective means to promote DDR and development in a sustainable fashion. Local government has always been the core level of decision making in Afghanistan. International reconstruction and peace-building processes must recognize this fundamental reality by coordinating their activities with local institutions and structures such as the village *Shura*.

#### **19. The Numbers Game**

All DDR processes face the danger of becoming overly fixated on disarmament, particularly the ‘numbers game’, regarding the number of arms collected. Removing all small arms from Afghan society is as implausible as banning arms in the United States. The goal of DDR is to demilitarize Afghanistan by demobilizing and disarming organized militia groups and to ensure that the ATA has a monopoly on the use of force. Special measures to collect and control small arms and light weapons could bolster the momentum for demobilization but it is not a precondition for it. In spite of its attractive simplicity, the numbers of arms collected is a not an adequate measure of the success of DDR and confuses the real purpose of the program.

#### **20. Engage NGOs in Reintegration Planning and Implementation**

It is critical that an integrative and inclusive approach to Reintegration planning and implementation is taken in Afghanistan. This involves extensive consultation and coordination with NGOs and Afghan civil society, which are best placed to provide reintegration support in many parts of the country. To date, the level of NGO involvement in the reintegration planning process has been insufficient. A successful reintegration program exploits synergies amongst a



multitude of actors, one of the most notable groups being international and local NGOs. The ATA and UNAMA must work more assiduously to integrate NGOs into the current DDR process.

### ***Judicial Reform***

#### **21. Accelerate Judicial Reform**

With the judicial system in Afghanistan in disarray and progress in police reform having exceeded that of the justice sector, the courts currently lack the capacity to handle the volume of cases brought before them. Accordingly, criminals apprehended by police are released without punishment and innocent Afghans, with no recourse to legal protection, have been subjected to unlawful imprisonment. The reality is that the police cannot adequately maintain order until the country's justice system is reestablished. More donor support should be provided to the process.

#### **22. Establish a System of Free Defence Council**

Recent research by Amnesty International into the functioning of the court system revealed massive fair trial violations. One of the most worrying failures is the absence of any defence council. A system of free defence council is urgently required. To date, the judicial reform process has focussed entirely on judges and prosecutors. Another alarming pattern is the length of time detainees are held in pre-trial detention, sometimes for many months without ever coming before a judge. This needs to be remedied on a systematic basis.

### ***Counter-Narcotics***

#### **23. Develop Alternative Sources of Economic Livelihood**

It will be difficult for the ATA to lower production if they cannot provide alternative livelihoods for farmers. In drought-ridden areas of the country poppy is one of the only crops that farmers can afford to produce – it is attractive because it is drought resistant, easy to store, and extremely profitable. Therefore, the key to counter-narcotics efforts will be the provision of resources and know-how for farmers to grow alternative crops.

#### **24. De-legitimize Poppy Production**

Poppy cultivation has increased and come to be perceived as acceptable in recent decades. An information campaign, involving religious and community leaders, should seek to undermine this growing legitimization of the drug trade.

### ***Gender and Security***

#### **25. Gender and Policing**

There are currently 40 female recruits in the Kabul Police Academy, 28 in the one-year program and 12 in the advanced three-year program. German initiatives to increase female recruitment have had some success. According to a police academy spokesperson, they have received more applications from women than they have places. Nevertheless, conservative religious and social attitudes remain firmly rooted in Afghan society. Many men in Afghanistan have begun to accept that female police are needed, but only to carry out duties that male police cannot, such as body searches and arrests of women. Public awareness aiming to shift these ingrained cultural attitudes must be intensified and recruitment efforts expanded.

#### **26. Address the Issue of Domestic Violence Against Women**

Currently, when a woman or girl faces violence in her home or community there are virtually no effective mechanisms through which she can seek justice or protection. Codes of honour and

shame pressure women to remain silent about such abuse. Even the very small number of women who try to access help through the formal system are not given basic assistance. For example, in cases where the husband opposes a divorce, many judges have displayed an unwillingness to grant a divorce even in the face of compelling testimony detailing severe domestic violence. While women struggle to obtain divorces under such circumstances, men are able to declare divorce at any point without stating a reason. With the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, Afghanistan has an obligation to revise its legal codes to ensure that both men and women have an equal right to enter into and dissolve a marriage. While discriminatory laws are just one part of an interlocking set of barriers preventing women from accessing justice, the current period of constitutional drafting and legal reform provides an opportunity to erode and even eliminate this part of the barrier.

**27. Expand Access to Education for Women and Girls**

Primary education should be compulsory for all girls in Afghanistan. Schools for girls should be established in all of the provinces in order to address the exceedingly high rate of illiteracy and ignorance among women. Specialized training should be provided to women to educate them about their constitutional rights, Sharia Law, international standards of human rights, and the country's penal, judicial and civil codes.

**28. Targeted Employment Programs for Women**

Employment generation programs should target women in order to undercut their dependence on spouses and male relatives. Such initiatives could be incorporated into reintegration support programs for ex-combatants.

***Regional Issues***

**29. Secure the Adherence of Neighboring States to a Strict Policy of Non-interference**

The influence and interference of neighboring states in Afghanistan has been one of the principal sources of conflict and division in the country. Afghanistan's geopolitical importance has impelled regional states to surreptitiously compete for influence and pursue their interests via proxies, a tactic that has served to fragment the country along ethnic, religious and political lines. The most blatant offenders in this regard have been Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and to a lesser extent, the Central Asian states.

To arrest the growth of insecurity in Afghanistan, it is critical that regional states cease all support for sub-state actors—individual parties, tribes, and warlords. A significant step towards achieving this goal was made with the signing of the Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations, a pledge of non-interference by Afghanistan's immediate neighbours—Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, China and Iran—signed on 22 December 2002. The international community, most notably the United States, should exert pressure on the signatories of this declaration, along with other states with a history of intervention in Afghanistan, to observe the agreement's fundamental principle: the inviolability of Afghanistan's sovereignty.

Until external actors are compelled to cease meddling in Afghan internal affairs, efforts to overcome the centrifugal forces that have given rise to insecurity and instability in Afghanistan will be fruitless. A concerted diplomatic campaign, led by the United States, must be launched to forge an international agreement that bars external interference in Afghanistan. This agreement should proscribe the provision of economic aid, arms and equipment to sub-state actors and address the issues of customs duties and borders.

## ***Warlord Economies***

### **30. Prioritize Fiscal Measures to Confront Warlordism**

Undermining the economic foundations of the warlords should be prioritized. In this regard the following steps should be taken:

- A. New border posts should be established at the seven key points of entry, with special emphasis on Herat. They should be situated at defensible points at some distance from the existing posts and from major cities. International donors should equip these posts with the latest technological equipment to prosecute their duties. To assuage the concerns of regional leaders, customs revenue should be fairly distributed to regional governments. Coalition forces and ISAF would be required to facilitate the transition to this new system. The U.S., in particular, must use the threat of force to keep the warlords in line.
- B. The restoration of Afghanistan's road network is a vital step towards undermining the power bases of many of Afghanistan's warlords. Road reconstruction has proceeded at an unacceptably slow rate and should be energized. A new institution should be created to deal exclusively with the issue of roads and customs revenues. This must be an authoritative body that includes representatives of the ministries of Transport, Commerce, and Finance at the highest levels, as well as officials from international agencies and donors.

### **31. Encourage the Transition from a War to Peace Economy Through Increased Economic Investment**

Until the appeal of the current criminalized economy is blunted, all efforts to establish security in Afghanistan will be abortive. To circumvent this warlord economy it is necessary to give the warlords an economy to buy into. Large-scale investment in infrastructure, to rebuild roads and bridges, to revamp the irrigation system, and clean the *karez* network will give the warlords a vested interest in local government and economic management. It will spark a process to reform the warlords into businessmen, transforming warlordism into peacelordism. Although it is clear that investment could serve as a dominant engine of political, social and economic change in Afghanistan, it has been extremely slow to materialize. Illustrating this situation is the U.S.-led project to repair the Kabul-Kandahar highway. The project, initiated seven months ago, was supposed to generate thousands of jobs. However, to date, only 2 percent of the job has been finished and it has given work to a mere 100 people. A massive increase in donor investment is needed to create the spark necessary to rejuvenate Afghanistan's economy.

## ***Afghan Civil Society***

### **32. Encourage the Growth of Afghan Civil Society**

A key element of any strategy to undermine the power of the warlords is the creation of alternative voices and sources of influence outside current power structures. This can be achieved by strengthening Afghan civil society. There are two obvious targets for this support: the mosques and traditional tribal structures such as the village *Shura*. Western style NGOs should also be encouraged, although they have few traditional roots in Afghan society.

Afghan civil society organizations, as is the case in many other developing countries, will be as fragile as their funding sources. Durable and long-term funding is needed to develop civil society in a sustainable fashion. A practical plan to achieve this goal would be to create a civil society trust fund for every region in Afghanistan. The capital for each of these funds would be invested by foreign banks, out of the reach of warlords. The annual interest from the capital invested would provide a regular and established income for civil society organizations. Grants should be made

for five-year periods by a local committee of three-five people from each province, and paid quarterly by a donor-run office subject to adequate reporting and accounting standards. This would give civil society organizations the chance to develop themselves and their capacities.

Grants from this Regional Civil Society Trust Fund could be issued to a wide range of recipients such as mosque committees and Sufi groups for charitable work, to local NGOs, women's cooperatives, and to international NGOs committed to working on a long-term basis in the areas of regional education and health. Over time the project could help to create a new layer of non-governmental activity - independent of regional and national government - that would give the average Afghan a voice in the affairs of the state.

### ***The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)***

#### **33. Expand ISAF**

To date, the international community has dismissed ISAF expansion as too expensive, in part because most policy discussions have been approached in “all or nothing” terms. A strategy involving the expansion of ISAF to key urban centers and the commercial routes between them should be considered. NATO’s assumption of the command for ISAF in August 2003 provides a golden opportunity to expand the force, as it possesses the economic and military resources to carry out such a complex mission. With security conditions having deteriorated to the point where relief and reconstruction activities have been seriously curtailed across much of Afghanistan, the need for an expansion of the peacekeeping operation has never been more apparent.

### ***Coalition Military Forces***

#### **34. Expand the Mandate of the Coalition Forces**

Consistent with the US Pentagon’s statement that the Coalition has moved from fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to reconstruction and stabilization efforts, the mandate of coalition forces should be expanded to include:

- A. Facilitating the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants.
- B. Intervening in green-on-green fighting between local militias where civilian security is put at risk.
- C. Patrolling civilian areas and trade routes.
- D. Assisting national security forces to rein in regional warlords who refuse to accede to central control.

#### **35. Expand and Reconfigure the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)**

The PRTs have neither the resources nor the mandate to provide significant security protection or reconstruction, and as a result achieve little more than the veneer of engagement on both fronts. The PRTs should be:

- A. Reconfigured to focus exclusively on security sector reform and change their names to Provincial Security/Stabilization teams in order to clarify their role.

- B. Given adequate resources to provide a solid platform for security sector reform (DDR, police/army training, patrolling, peace making and peacekeeping) in the areas where they operate.

**36. Provide Central Government Liaisons to PRTs**

The central government should be encouraged to assign representatives to the PRTs to extend its influence outside the capital and enhance communication with the provinces. This would also serve to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the central government and coalition forces.

## ANNEX 1 – List of Participants

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Sven F.L. Helmet	Rachel Shakides	
	Deborah Sharp	

## **ANNEX 2 – LIST OF CONFERENCE PAPERS**

**Paul O'Brien and Paul Barker.** *Old Questions Needing New Answers: A Fresh Look at Security Needs in Afghanistan.*

**Daud Yaar.** *Significance and Problems of Security-Sector Reform in Afghanistan: An Alternative Approach.*

**Nasrin Magda Katona.** *Thoughts on the Implementation of Afghan Security Sector Reform.*

**Mark Sedra.** *Police Reform in Afghanistan: An Overview.*

**Antonio Giustozzi.** *Military Reform in Afghanistan.*

**Aqab Khan Malik.** *The New Afghan Army and Pashtun Disaffection.*

**Dirk Salomons.** *The Moment of Truth: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants as Indicators of a Successful Peace Process.*

**Barnett R. Rubin.** *Identifying Options and Entry Points for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Afghanistan.*

**Vera Chrobok.** *Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Afghanistan.*

**Shukuko Koyama.** *Weapons Collection: Lessons Learned from the Weapons for Development Project in Mali.*

**Sadiqa Basiri.** *Gender and Security Issues: Women in Afghanistan.*

**Barbara J. Stapleton.** *The Provincial Reconstruction Team Plan in Afghanistan: A New Direction?*

**S. Frederick Starr.** *Karzai's Fiscal Foes and How to Beat Them.*

*\* A selection of the conference papers, revised and updated, will be published as a BICC Brief in August 2003. Please contact Mark Sedra at [sedra@bicc.de](mailto:sedra@bicc.de) for more information.*